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JOHN RAWLS AND THE CONFLICT 
B E T W E E N RIGHT AND GOOD 
JOHN McNAUGHTON 
Conduct is complex. It is so complex 
that attempts to reduce it intellectually to a 
single principle have failed. We have already 
noted two leading considerations which cut 
across each other: ends which are judged to 
satisfy desire,and the claims of right and 
duty which inhibit desire. 
As John Dewey indicates here, the history of ethics 
represents, in one sense, a struggle between those who 
emphasize the role of ends and desires in human conduct 
(the Good) and those who stress the rights and duties 
that can be said to "inhibit" desires (the Right). For 
the most part, the battle lines have been drawn quite 
clearly, with each side taking careful aim at the 
other, firing salvos of well-rehearsed arguments as 
they stand behind a mail of time-honored logical armor. 
These timeless disputes have carried on to the present 
day under such guises as natural vs. positive law, 
teleological or naturalistic ethics vs. deontological 
ethics, etc. Rarely, however, has anyone come along 
and attempted to bridge the gap between the two 
divergent schools of ethical thought. In fact, one 
might ask (as we shall later in this paper) whether, 
given the nature of the disputants and the initial 
premises of their arguments, a truce is even possible 
between the two warring factions without the total 
subsumption of one view under the other. More 
precisely, is a synthesis possible between "right-
oriented" and "good-oriented" systems of ethics? Or-
ate they destined to remain forever apart? 
Into this ethical breach steps John Rawls, whose 
book, A Theory of Justice, is undoubtedly one of the 
major works of ethics in this century. What makes his 
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work unique is its comprehensive nature, the attempt to 
cover all bases in the quest for a meaningful sense of 
justice. He is not content to remain strictly within 
one ethical tradition or other, but seeks a view of 
justice that will take into account the best aspects of 
all previous theories of justice. He borrows the 
ideals of personal growth from Aristotle (via his so-
called Aristotelian Principle), incorporates the 
political savvy of Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes, the so-
called contract theorists, and admires (and ultimately 
endorses) the strict sense of "moral autonomy" that is 
Kant's contribution to ethics. Furthermore, he 
attempts to integrate these classical doctrines with 
some of the "hard" data of the contemporary social 
sciences. 
But whereas traditional systems of ethics have 
tilted to one side or the other, Rawls seeks a theory 
of justice that has a strict, "analytical" coherence, 
but at the same time possesses a solid foundation in 
the concrete, "synthetic" world of observed human 
behavior. That is, in terms of the classical dispute 
mentioned above, he seeks a view of justice that 
combines the advantages of both good-oriented and 
right-oriented systems (or to use his terms, a 
"congruence" between "justice as fairness" and 
"goodness as rationality"). Thus in Rawls's own words, 
"what is to be established is that it is rational for 
those in a well-ordered society to affirm their 2sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life." Or 
to put it another way, Rawls wants to show that "the 
desire to act justly and the desire to express our 
nature as free moral persons turn out,to specify what 
is practically speaking the same desire 
Does Rawls succeed in this endeavor? Or, perhaps 
more to the point, can he succeed, i.e., is such a 
synthesis or "congruence" between the Right and the 
Good even possible, given the traditional definitions 
of these terms? It is to these questions, then, that 
our paper is addressed. That is, using Rawls as a 
foil, as an example of one who tries to incorporate or 
synthesize the best of both competing approaches, we 
examine the relative merits of a "right-oriented" or 
deontological system of justice and a "good-oriented" 
or naturalistic view. We do so, first, by providing a 
loose sketch or outline of the two competing views and, 
second, by briefly examining Rawls's attempt in Part 
Three of A Theory of Justice to contrast the Right and 
the Good in relation to his own theory. Here we find 
that despite his professed desire to provide a theory 
of justice wherein the Right and the Good are somehow 
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congruent, he nonetheless tilts ultimately in the 
direction of the Right, or the deontological, and thus 
belies his earlier claim for congruence. Finally, 
Rawls aside, we ask once again, is such a synthesis 
between Right and Good even possible? Or are the 
notions of Right and Good, as they are traditionally 
defined, mutually exclusive and, as such, incapable of 
being joined together on an equal footing? If so, does 
this render fruitless all attempts such as Rawls's to 
codify justice in a fair, humane way? Or perhaps is 
the problem not in the actual striving for a coherent 
system of justice, but in the way the ground rules of 
the "game" have traditionally been set up? That is, 
does the traditional terminology of ethics (right vs. 
good, is vs. ought, etc.) even allow of a solution to 
such problems, or does it stand as an obstacle in the 
path to any solution? In this sense, the very strength 
of Rawls's theory (its comprehensive approach to the 
subject-matter, the ability to combine the various 
terminologies and views of widely divergent systems of 
ethics, and its deep, historical background) may turn 
out to be its very weakness. 
On the formal level, we can approach justice in 
either of two ways: (1) as an external, formal, 
"universal," objective quality which can be derived 
through strict, deductive reasoning and in accordance 
with whose principles certain laws, norms, or 
regulations can be prescribed; or (2) as a more 
naturalistic phenomenon, arrived at through observation 
or description of basic human interrelationships on 
both the personal and societal levels. 
(1) The first approach to justice is characterized 
in formal ethics as that of deontology. Briefly 
sketched, deontology is a nonnatural ethics which 
emphasizes the performance of duty and the primacy of 
"right" in an ethical system. On this view some acts 
are morally obligatory regardless of the consequences 
they entail, since thay are derived from the overriding 
concept of Right. Consequently, it is our ethical duty 
to act always in accordance with this Right. Right is 
sui generis and can never be reduced to a good or to a 
teleological theory (Rawls himself emphasizes the 
latter point quite strongly). The basic mode of 
reasoning in a deontological system is deductive, i.e., 
the values of acts and institutions can be directly 
related to the principles of Right which exist prior 
to, and independently of, experience. Classically, of 
course, the major proponent of the deontological 
approach is Immanuel Kant, who saw ethics as a process 
of the deductive, rational, and intellectual 
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recognition of an abstract truth (the Right). Rawls's 
obvious infatuation with Kant needs no comment here, 
but what is interesting to note is the great deal of 
attention that Rawls pays to such contemporary 
deontologists such as Ross, Prichard, and Broad (for 
example W. D. Ross receives eight references in A 
Theory of Justice, more than just about any other 
contemporary ethician; more even than Locke or 
Rousseau I). 
(2) The second approach to justice is what might 
loosely be called the naturalistic approach. Here, 
more attention is paid to man's cultural endowment and 
to the descriptive facts of psychology, sociology, 
economics, science, etc. Unlike deontology, the acts 
in a naturalistic ethics can be evaluated in terms of 
the consequences they effect. In this case the 
principles of justice are always subject to revision, 
depending on the given ethical situation. Here, 
ethical systems can arise out of need and social 
cooperation. the type of reasoning is more "inductive" 
(i.e., rules, etc. are based on knowledge of general 
synthetic facts) and is more apt to be based on 
convention or agreement. The best historical example 
of this approach to ethics is contained in the works of 
the utilitarians, who argue that justice presupposes a 
prior awareness of substantive good, one that pertains 
to concrete, everyday interaction with the surrounding 
personal and social environment—namely, the 
Aristotelian awareness that all persons are always and 
continually involved in the pursuit of a concrete end, 
happiness, or pleasure. The American naturalist 
philosophers, especially Dewey, might also serve as an 
example of practitioners of this type of ethics. 
Having roughly sketched these two basic approaches 
to justice, we can now perhaps see Rawls's quandary: 
he wants to incorporate elements of both approaches 
into his theory. But, as we have already noted, is it 
really possible to construct a theory of justice based 
on a synthesis of such seemingly divergent ethical 
modes? To a large degree, Rawls seems to be successful 
in this attempt. Nonetheless, it appears that at 
certain crucial points in his theory he is compelled to 
force his hand in one direction or other, and in so 
doing must sacrifice some of the benefits that might 
accrue from the successful conjunction of the two 
systems of ethics. 
Accordingly, it appears that despite the many 
compelling arguments presented in the latter part of A 
Theory of Just ice with regard to the Good, Rawls 
274 
nevertheless comes down hard on the side of the Right. 
He wants, ultimately, to show that the principles of 
justice have such a binding force that all life-plans 
and plans for the use and distribution of goods must be 
made in accordnace with them. The clearest expression 
by Rawls of the contrast and, ultimately, the priority 
of Right in relation to the Good can be found in 
section 68 of A Theory of Justice ("The Right and the 
Good Contrasted"). Therefore we will comment briefly 
on this section. 
First of all, it is interesting to note that this 
section appears square in the middle of Rawls's rather 
"naturalistic" explication of the notion of the Good in 
Part Three. In this chapter ("Goodness as 
Rationality") appear descriptions of such naturalistic 
phenomena as human life-plans, shame, self-respect, 
excellence, and deliberation. We label Rawls's 
approach to these phenomena as naturalistic since, when 
discussing them, we do not need to make any recourse to 
absolute, pre-established, formal standards in order to 
make any sense out of them; i.e., in this case we are 
discussing particular human acts and tendencies which 
arise in particular situations, and whose ethical 
effects can be judged and evaluated. Thus it appears 
that in placing this section on the contrast between 
the right and the good at the end of the chapter on 
Goodness as Rationality ("lexical ordering," to borrow 
Rawls's phrase), Rawls is attempting to warn us not to 
get so caught up in his naturalistic forays that we 
forget the proper priorities painstakingly deduced in 
the first part of the book, i.e., the priority of the 
virtue of justice in human affairs and the priority of 
right over good. Consequently, even in the most 
descriptive, naturalistic sections of the book, Rawls's 
leanings toward the deontological view of justice are 
luminously evident and the seeming inconsistency of 
trying to synthesize naturalism and deontology is made 
most clear. 
Section 68, then, is a key section insofar as 
through its recapitulation of the principles of Right 
("justice as fairness") presented earlier in the 
theory, it attempts to provide the glue by which his 
theoy of goodness can hold together. The aim of this 
section is to convince us that under Rawls's principles 
of justice we stand to lose very little in the way of 
freedoms and opportunities that we now possess. 
Furthermore, Rawls emphasizes the importance of 
diversity in individual life-plans and goods. As a 
matter of fact, Rawls contends, our life-plans and 
individual aims are more enhanced, since the principles 
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of justice as fairness insure the "moral worth" of 
those plans. He further emphasizes that "there is no 
urgency to reach a publically accepted judgment as to 
what is the good of particular individuals." Thus 
individuals, in the pursuit of their personal goals, 
need not fear that the binding consensus of the 
principles of justice will extend downward, as it were, 
and quash all self-expression. Here, "persons are left 
to determine their good, 5the views of others being counted as merely advisory." Rawls even goes further, 
in the spirit of "goodness as rationality," and argues 
that it is not only desirable but "rational for members 
of a well-ordered society to want their plans to be 
different," since recognition of a diverse range of 
good in life-plans encourages individual self-respect, 
that highest of all Rawlsian virtues. 
Furthermore, the strictures on knowledge (the "veil 
of ignorance") which are in effect in the original 
position and in the principles of justice do not apply 
once the veil is lifted. Thus, in the discussion and 
evaluation of individual good, the full range of 
particular facts of human knowledge is allowed into 
play. Individual life-plans are to be adjusted to 
particular situations: "a rational plan of life takes 
into account our special abilities, interests, and 
circumstances, and therefore it quite properly depends 
upon our social position and natural assets." 
Rawls here makes a very convincing appeal for the 
importance of individual life-plans and argues strongly 
that the adoption of the principles of justice as 
fairness will not threaten the rights and freedoms to 
which we have all been accustomed. But indeed, how 
convincing are these assurances once we realize that 
ultimately for Rawls: 
Our way of life, whatever our particular 
circumstances, must always conform to the 
principles of justice that are arrived at 
independently. Thus the arbitrary features of 
plans of life do not affect these principles, 
or how the basic structure is to be arranged. 
The indeterminacy in the notion of rationality 
does not translate itself into legitimate 
claims that men can impose on one another. 
The priority of right prevents this. {my 
emphasis) 
Here Rawls lays Jus cards on the table. 
Multiplicity and variation of life-plans are to be 
allowed and individual self-expression encouraged, BUT 
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ONLY TO A POINT! They cannot conflict in any way with 
the pre-established principles of justice, since "the 
priority of right prevents this." Thus no matter how 
much Rawls may embellish his theory of the good to 
include individual aims and desires; no matter how many 
safeguards he installs in his theory to prevent 
encroachments on individual self-expression and 
liberty, once he postulates in any way that right takes 
precedence over good, then his theory thereby becomes 
deontological and is consequently subject to all the 
criticism which the latter doctrine entails (e.g., that 
it is unnecessarily dogmatic, that it fails to take 
into account changing social and environmental 
conditions, that it presupposes a certain 
unacknowledged psychological view of man, etc.). 
Perhaps it was Dewey who best articulated the 
misgivings that many have with regard to a 
deontological ethics: 
Experience shows that the subordination of 
human good to an external and formal rule 
tends in the direction of harshness and 
cruelty. The common saying that justice 
should be tempered with mercy is the popular 
way of stating recognition of the hard and 
ultimately unjust character of setting up a 
principle of action which is divorced from all 
consideration of human consequences. Justice 
as an end in itself is a case of making an 
idol out of a means at the expense of the end 
which the means serves." 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss exhaustively the comparative merits of a 
deontological versus a naturalistic ethics. But what 
is important here from our standpoint is Rawls's claim 
that in his system the right and good are somehow 
"congruent" with one another, i.e., that "justice as 
fairness" is congruent with the notion of "goodness as 
rationality," or, more precisely, that "it is rational 
for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their 
sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life." 
In other words, it is rational for us to desire 
justice (the Right) as an end (the Good), hence a 
"congruence." As this statement indicates, and as we 
have previously noted, Rawls tries to incorporate as 
many elements as possible from both deontological 
(right-oriented) and naturalistic (good-oriented) 
systems of ethics, such that his theory can be said, as 
it were, to provide us with the "best of both worlds," 
the combined advantages of both systems. Yet his 
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repeated emphasis on the priority of Right in Iiis 
theory belies his claim for congruence. 
More importantly, is such a congruence even 
possible given the divergent premises of the two 
approaches to ethics. Although the good and the right, 
as Rawls sets them up, may be eminently compatible, it 
does not follow from this that they are thereby made 
congruent and are capable of synthesis into a theory of 
justice. 
Can the notions of right and good ever be made 
congruent, or are they simply mutually exclusive? It 
appears that once the element of right is allowed into 
an ethical theory, it must, by definition, take 
precedence over the good. If right does not take 
precedence over the good, then right necessarily 
becomes relative to the good, thus becoming a good 
itself. That is, if right is relative, and not 
"absolute," its value must then be relative to some 
perceived good (that quality by which one right is 
selected or accepted and another rejected). The latter 
view is, in fact, held by the naturalists, i.e., that 
in the course of everyday social and ethical 
interaction, certain values emerge which themselves are 
subject to change in accordance with further 
alterations in those existential situations. It is 
interesting to note in Part Three of A Theory of 
Justice that the same arguments Rawls uses in support 
of such positions as those of individual integrity, the 
need for the diversity of life-plans, etc. are often 
used by the naturalists to support thei r claim that, 
there is NO overriding principle(s) of right. That is, 
again, that values emerge in the acting-out of life-
plans and do not exist beforehand in an absolute, 
deontological fashion. 
Thus in the question of right vs. good, 
epistemology vs. ethics, deontology vs. naturalism, 
there is, unfortunately, no middle ground. These 
positions cannot exist coequally since the usual 
definition of each of these terms excludes the notion 
of its opposite within itself (in fact, usually as 
subordinate to itself). Accordingly, the proponents of 
the Right see good as resulting from the proper 
adherence to the Right, while the champions of the Good 
view the right as something which emerges in the 
pursuit of the Good. 
Our arguments along these lines should not be 
construed as mere Jesuitical hair-splitting of 
definitions, for they point to a wider problem. As 
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long as ethics and justice, in particular, continue to 
be viewed and defined in terms of these classical 
philosophical distinctions, those of what James called 
"intellectualism" (i.e., right vs. good, is vs. ought, 
etc; as Dewey often pointed out, to set up an 
exhaustive dualism presupposes, often wrongly, that the 
entities are entirely separate to begin with), 
inconsistencies such as those outlined here with regard 
to Rawls's theory are bound to appear. The complex 
psychological, motivational, biological, and cultural 
patterns woven into the exquisite tapestry that is man 
and his actions are far too sophisticated to be reduced 
exclusively to particular concepts such as those of 
right and good. A proper delineation of justice 
requires as its necessary propaedeutic an adequate 
description of man IN his ethical situation, his 
concrete relationships to himself, to Others, and to 
the world around him. These "existential" phenomena 
must be dealt with in the manner in which they occur, 
in actu, and not merely as facts to be grouped under 
one conceptual heading or another. 
Rawls, for his part, does an excellent job on this 
count, especially in the latter part of his theory. He 
displays a sound understanding of the nature of social 
and institutional behavior. He also possesses keen 
historical insight into the past philosophical 
attemtpts at theorizing justice and has an uncanny 
knack of being able to pull the best elements out of 
competing views on justice, and then to synthesize them 
into one strong, internally coherent position. 
But insofar as Rawls chooses to view justice 
deontologically, to see Right as the preeminent concern 
of a well-ordered society and adherence to "Tightness" 
as the preeminent concern of the individual in that 
society, then A Theory of Justice will be no more than 
just another attempt, albeit ä well-intentioned and 
thought-out one, at a rationalistic ethics, "condemned" 
(to classrooms and seminars and not to application to 
the real problems of humans) for its failure to include 
the "whole" person, not just the rational part of 
him/her, in its initial premises. 
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale 
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